Cli-fi and the Uncanny

Author(s): Gregers Andersen

Source: *Interdisciplinary Studies in Literature and Environment*, Autumn 2016, Vol. 23, No. 4 (Autumn 2016), pp. 855-866

Published by: Oxford University Press

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/26569720

Gregers Andersen

Cli-fi and the Uncanny

> We're staying off the beaten track. Heavy rain. This notebook's pages have gone all wavy. At least biro doesn't run. I am lying inside the tent now, G is out foraging. We got away in the middle of the night. G slung our two rucksacks across the bike. We took turns to wheel it, then on the fourth morning we woke up and looked outside the tent flap and it was gone even though we'd covered it with leaves the night before. "Could be worse," said G, "We could have had our throats cut while we slept." (Simpson 122)

In Helen Simpson's short story "A Diary of an Interesting Year" (2010), we are plunged into a world of great insecurity. In principle, this eerie world could be any kind of world where violence is the main human means of expression. However, it is a world in which the eerie atmosphere is not only caused by rapid social collapse. Simpson's story goes beyond typical post-apocalyptic fictions that depict a ruptured social contract and individuals battling it out for limited resources in a world where empathy is gone. In contrast to many of these fictions, the origin of the insecurity and the eeriness in Simpson's story also comes from the weather. In "A Diary of an Interesting Year," the rain goes on and on and gives the horizon that surrounds the narrator and her husband G a permanent dark-gray color. This, along with the ruptured social contract, makes the affective atmosphere of their being-in-the-world both depressing and disconcerting.

ISLE: Interdisciplinary Studies in Literature and Environment 23.4 (Autumn 2016), pp. 855–866
Advance Access publication November 16, 2016 doi:10.1093/isle/isw068

This observation gains further significance when we consider "A Diary of an Interesting Year" as a climate fiction (cli-fi), a term I suggest should only be used to describe fictions that specifically employ the scientific paradigm of anthropogenic global warming in their plots.[1] In Simpson's story, humanity's emissions of greenhouse gases have pushed the weather into a pattern of ongoing fog, rain, and darkness. This is the reason for "the Collapse" in the story: a condition that implies both a breakdown of any stable economic system and of the institutions conducting law and order (Simpson 119). In fact, the only institutional power that is mentioned in the story is partly responsible for the character's plight. Thus, in the beginning of the story, the institutional power places a group of Spanish climate refugees in the narrator and G's apartment, which is then forcibly appropriated by the refugees.

After this event, the narrator and G head for the milder climate of a warmed Siberia through a drenched Britain, where small parties of refugees attack, rob, rape, and kill each other. Here, we are witness to the fictive operationalization of what I suggest we call the imaginary of "the Social Collapse." That is, the imaginary that anthropogenic global warming will sometime in the future (the story takes place in 2040) result in extreme social disintegration and human violence on a very large scale. Aside from its use in a number of works of popular science—such as Gwynne Dyer's *Climate Wars* (2008), Harald Welzer's *Klimakriege* (2010), and Christian Parenti's *Tropic of Chaos* (2011)—this imaginary is also fictively operationalized in a number of contemporary cli-fis. In literary post-apocalyptic cli-fis such as Marcel Theroux's *Far North* (2009), Steven Amsterdam's *Things We Didn't See Coming* (2009), and Martine McDonagh's *I Have Waited, And You Have Come* (2012), as well as in the post-apocalyptic cli-fi movie *The Colony* (2013), one finds protagonists confronted with a world similarly characterized by depressing changes in weather patterns and terrifying interhuman violence.

Before returning to a more detailed philosophical interpretation of the specific kind of being-in-the-world that the fictive operationalization of this imaginary makes visible in "A Diary of an Interesting Year," I would like to reflect on its cultural history. But first it seems appropriate to make the perhaps obvious epistemological point that a phenomenon such as anthropogenic global warming does not enter our consciousness in a straightforward and uncomplicated way. Instead, the "fore-structure of understanding" (one of the most important concepts from modern hermeneutics) means that there is always already a *pre-understanding* that guides our cognition (Heidegger 192). This means that the imagination of future anthropogenic global

warming is not exclusively the result of recent scientific investigation but is also the result of a long cultural history. The new is imagined through the cognitive schemes of the old in a process of dialectical adjustment very similar to what French anthropologist Claude Lévi-Strauss once termed "bricolage" (48–49). That is, the application of fragments from old narrative templates in the creation of new ones.

For example, when looking at the world described in Simpson's short story, it is apparent that the biblical story of Babel is one of the narrative templates that informs the imagination of this future climate changed world. In Simpson's story, we do not, however, find a punishing God that effectively puts a presumptuous humanity back into its place by dividing it up into antagonistic clans. Instead, humanity's progress is undone by its own scientific and technological aptitude as industrial modernity first leads to anthropogenic global warming and then sets into motion a world wherein climate refugees incapable of communicating are engaged in a battle to death. This is visible in the story when G and the narrator's escape from the insecure world they have been thrown into hits an impasse. G is killed and the narrator is turned into a sex slave by his killer, who continuously beats her. Or, as it reads in the laconic diary style of the short story: "M speaks another language. Norwegian? Dutch? Croatian? We can't talk, so he hits me instead" (Simpson 125).

This is a world-making of Babel-like proportions, since the breakdown in communication here symbolizes a far more serious breakdown in human relations. That said, the configuration of this idea is by no means unique to cli-fi. As the American political scientist Claire P. Curtis has made clear, it is typical that post-apocalyptic fictions in general depict a world where life is "nasty, brutish and short" as in the Hobbesian state of nature (8). Therefore, we should not be too surprised to find "broken worlds" in this genre where violence has become the primary means of communication between antagonistic individuals or groups. On the other hand, we will not thoroughly understand what cli-fi reveals about our existential situation as contemporary and future human beings if we are simply satisfied with pointing to obvious cases of intertextuality and the influence of a long cultural history.

A more adequate entry point is to focus on how Simpson's short story "builds" on the scientific predictions that anthropogenic global warming will lead to a future acceleration in the number of climate refugees as well as "increase hunger" and the scarcity of drinking water (Bernstein, Pachauri, and Reisinger, 48, 52–53). Cli-fi is a very important thought-experiment in our contemporary world exactly because it is mimetic in this sense. It basically makes what is not yet

visible for us visible, without being an exact representation of it, as it "builds" its worlds from a ground (or from within a framework) that is scientifically probable.

Paul Ricoeur is worth mentioning here, as he was one of the twentieth century's key thinkers of the relationship between *mimesis* and free creation. According to Ricoeur, "the first way human beings attempt to understand and to master the 'manifold' of the practical field is to give themselves a fictive representation of it" ("Text to Action" 176). However, in Ricoeur's theory of how fiction holds the power to shape reality, it is only able to do so because it sets up worlds that are not real, but which could be. That is, worlds that are comparable to the real world in their "semantics of action," in spite of being fictive ("Time and Narrative" 54). This is also the main argument behind Ricoeur's central statement that the essential duty of the interpreter is "not to recover, behind the text, the lost intention [of its author] but to unfold, in front of the text, the 'world' it opens" in order to explicate the most important kinds of "being-in-the-world displayed by the text" ("Text to Action" 33–34). Thus, according to Ricoeur, fictional ways of "being-in-the-world" are interesting and analytically useful not only because they are symbolically able to show us (the readers) something we may consider to be a truthful reflection of our human lot. They are also useful because this symbolic power gives them a potential to shape our future cognition and actions.

With these reflections in mind, let me now return to Simpson's story in order to explicate the kind of climate-changed-being-in-the-world that the narrator and G experience. I term this particular form of existence "uncanny," and not just to point to the apparent eeriness of the world the narrator and G experience in a general sense. I would like to make a more specific point by recalling how the concept of the uncanny—or "das Unheimliche"—was interpreted differently by Heidegger and Freud. Freud devoted an essay to this concept in 1919, but it will perhaps come as a surprise that the concept also figures in Heidegger's magnum opus *Being and Time* (1927). In paragraph 40 of *Being and Time*—a paragraph devoted to the description of anxiety (Angst) as a state-of-mind—Heidegger writes:

> . . . as Dasein falls, anxiety brings it back from its absorption in the "world." Everyday familiarity collapses. Dasein has been individualized, but individualized as Being-in-the-world. Being-in enters into the existential "mode" of the "not-at-home." Nothing else is meant by our talk about "uncanniness" (233).

What this rather cryptic description implies is basically (1) that anxiety as a state-of-mind holds the power to recall the human subject from its flight into conventional existence and (2) that this is experienced as a feeling of not being at home in one's being. However, what I want to extract from this description in order to give it a more contemporary sociological meaning is the idea of the uncanny as a state-of-mind or *Stimmung*. In order for this idea to be useful for interpreting cli-fi's ways of being-in-the-world, it is necessary to introduce one of Heidegger's many disciples and critics, namely the German philosopher Hermann Schmitz. According to Schmitz, in his ontological account of *Dasein* (human existence), Heidegger misses that the uncanny is not only experienced as an anxiety that originates from the fact that Dasein is arbitrarily thrown into a finite existence, a being-in-the-world that it must make its own. The uncanny is (as the state-of-mind of a human being that is afraid) also experienced as characteristic of "the entire surrounding horizon" ("das umgreifende, ungeteilte Ganze"). This is because feelings, according to Schmitz, are atmospheric, and therefore merge inner and outer experience into an affective whole (Schmitz 283).

Returning to "A Diary of an Interesting Year," I will suggest that this description of the uncanny as an affective atmosphere accurately applies to the narrator's and G's experience of the climate changed world in the short story. This is not only the case, because the narrator and G are thrown into a world which is barely recognizable, and thus feels unhomely, due to the rapid and ongoing changes in weather patterns. Their world is also uncanny because the interhuman relationships in this world have changed. From a once familiar world where humans could trust one another, "the Collapse" has brought forth an unhomely world wherein every violent action is absorbed by an affective atmosphere that is increasingly eerie. However, when this uncanny being-in-the-world is visible in Simpson's story, it is not just because the narrator and G experience interhuman violence in an eerie, climate-changed world. What I want to convey with the concept of the uncanny is a bit more sophisticated, as it hinges on a distinction made by Heidegger between anxiety and fear.

Thus in *Being and Time* Heidegger claims that anxiety has no object as it arises out of our very being-in-the-world as thrown, while fear is caused by something we encounter "within-the-world" ("ein innerweltlich Begegnendes") (179). Keeping this in mind, what is useful about describing the main characteristic of the climate-changed-being-in-the-world made visible in "A Diary of An Interesting Year" as uncanny, is basically that it does not require us to trace the eeriness of this being-in-the-world back to one specific object "within-the-world."

Instead, we can describe the whole horizon of this being-in-the-world as something continuously eerie or unhomely in an uncanny way. In others words, the uncanny is here the *Stimmung* of a horizontal frame in which a concrete object of fear is not visible or in other ways sensuously apparent.

The Uncanny Quasi-Objects of the Judgment

With the above description functioning as "an unfolding" of one specific kind of climate changed being-in-the-world, it is now time to introduce another world in order to unfold yet another kind of climate changed being-in-the-world. I suggest that we call this next world the world of "the Judgment." In some senses, the fictional world of the Judgment is one that Western civilization has known for several millennia, as it can be seen in *The Epic of Gilgamesh* and the flood narrative of the *Genesis*, amongst others. However, what is new about the Judgment as it appears in contemporary cli-fi, is that here it is no longer God who sends punishment through disastrous floods or weather-related events. Instead, it is the nonhuman world, "Nature" itself, which performs the job of both judge and executioner. In cli-fis that use the Judgment in their world making, nature is imagined to be endowed with the agency to punish a humanity who has gone too far in its violation of basic ecological laws.[2]

This is important in the context of the arguments I have raised so far because in contemporary cli-fi this punishment is experienced by the characters as an encounter with nonhuman entities that are uncanny in a Freudian (rather than a Heideggerian) sense. That is, nonhuman entities that appear both familiar and strange since they are animated by an agency to punish that makes them unnerving. Going back to Freud's essay on "The Uncanny" (1919), we find another reason for "the uncanniness" of these entities. In this essay, Freud does not limit himself just to an explanation of how animated objects can evoke an uncanny feeling by confronting the modern human with an "old animistic view" it thought it had long repudiated (147). He also understands the animated object to be the distorted expression of long repressed fantasies (148).

However, what makes the animated object uncanny in contemporary cli-fi is not so much that it represents repressed fantasies. In fact, it represents the return of the repressed in an entirely different way. In cli-fi, the animated, revengeful nonhuman entity is experienced as uncanny (by both the characters in the fiction and the viewers/readers of the fiction) because it marks the end of the idea that the nonhuman world is a God-given space for human mastery populated with Cartesian objects. What returns from the shadows of the repressed in cli-fi is a different kind of object, namely what French philosopher of

science, Bruno Latour, has called "a quasi-object" ("Modern" 64). That is, an object which simultaneously belongs to the nonhuman and human world and which, in the era of accelerating climate change (i.e., the Anthropocene), presents itself to the human consciousness as a part of a more "*generalized revolts of the means*, [since] no entity . . . agrees any longer to be treated 'simply as a means' but insists on being treated 'always also as an end'" ("Politics" 155–56).

I would like to elaborate on this by once again focusing on one of the cli-fis functioning as the interpretative background of this article: Roland Emmerich's Hollywood movie *The Day After Tomorrow* (2004). In Emmerich's movie, we (the viewers) are presented with an array of monstrously scaled quasi-objects, but only after an important scene in the beginning of the movie. In this scene, the main protagonist, climatologist Jack Hall (Dennis Quaid), warns an assembly of leading politicians and scientists of the imminent danger of transgressing climatic tipping points at a UN-summit in New Delhi, only to be interrupted by the American vice-president. The central part of their dialogue proceeds as follows:

> Hall: If we do not act soon, our children and grandchildren will have to pay the price.
> Vice President: And who's going to pay the price of the Kyoto Accord? It would cost the world's economy hundreds of billions of dollars.
> Hall: With all due respect, Mr. Vice President, the cost of doing nothing could be even higher. Our climate is fragile.
> Vice President: Professor Hall, our economy is every bit as fragile as the environment.

The scene is important because in the Vice President's reference to the fragility of the global economy we get a glimpse of what Cartesian ontology has amounted to in modernity. Namely, the destructive divide between Nature and society that Latour has fittingly called "the modern Constitution" ("Modern" 29). However, this glimpse is only there to spell the end of this Constitution and the arrogance and moral decay it has brought along with it in terms of how humanity treats the nonhuman world. Minutes after this scene, myriads of uncanny quasi-objects take the stage, as all kinds of phenomena—stretching from hailstorms capable of killing humans to vicious swarms of incredibly destructive tornados—cause disarray around the world, before their appearance accelerates into a crescendo where New York is not only flooded, but also ravaged by one of three gigantic storms.

Representing the main animistic monsters of the movie, these storms contain "super cooled air," which instantly kills everything that their "eyes" fall upon. Thus as the movie takes full advantage of the

animistic metaphor "the eye of the storm," it becomes increasingly obvious that the characters of the story are confronted with a nonhuman world that has been repressed in the ontology of the moderns. The nonhuman world that the vice president could deny as a matter of concern by referring to the concerns of the global market can at this stage in the movie no longer be ignored. Its appearance as quasi-objects, as monstrous hybrids of the extreme intermingling of humanity with nature (and thus as a product of the Anthropocene), is simply too noisy, too uncanny to be missed.

One scene that illustrates this particularly well plays out when Jack Hall's son, Sam (Jake Gyllenhall) and two of his friends try to return to New York's central public library (their temporary safe haven) after they have found some lifesaving medicine for the girl Sam is romantically interested in. Having barely escaped a pack of hungry wolves on the deserted supertanker where they find the medicine, Sam and his friends are literally chased by one of the storms on their way back to the library. As its eye moves closer and closer to Sam and his friends and everything around them begins to freeze, the soundtrack of the movie is dominated by the snarling of something that sounds like a very large and very angry animal. At this point, the storm is animated as a living entity that is not very fond of humans.

It is of course possible to perceive this scene purely as an example of Hollywood's love of sound effects, but what is at stake here is hardly that innocent. Rather, what this scene fleshes out is not only that humanity has entered a new era of uncanny quasi-objects. It also marks a return to the old imaginary of the Judgment. Contemporary cli-fis tend to leave out the punishing God and reflect a more modern, and Nietzchean, idea that God is dead and that the world has been left in the hands of human caretakers. However, what the imaginary of the Judgment is frequently used to imply in cli-fi is that other beings are ready to take over as caretaker if humanity continues to fail in its assignment. These beings are very similar to what the prizewinning British chemist and environmentalist James Lovelock has famously called *Gaia*, an intelligent biosphere ready to wage "war" against humanity in order to defend itself (109).

By this remark, I am not claiming that we are, as viewers of *The Day After Tomorrow,* confronted with a nonhuman world operating as one single, intentionally unified war machine. While such a "vulgar" application of Lovelock's Gaia thesis can certainly be found in contemporary cli-fi, the destructive quasi-objects of *The Day After Tomorrow* are not the result of a coherent agency within the nonhuman world. Instead, these quasi-objects are depicted as a random acceleration of disastrous events set into motion by interrelated feedback loops. We get here a

fragmented version of Gaia that is very much in line with a recent reflection put forward by Latour. In his article "Waiting for Gaia. Composing The Common World through Arts and Politics" (2011), Latour writes:

> The great thing about Lovelock's Gaia is that it reacts, feels and might get rid of us, without being ontologically unified. It is not a superorganism endowed with any sort of unified agency. It is actually this total lack of unity that makes Gaia *politically* interesting. She is not a sovereign power lording it over us. Actually, in keeping with what I see as a healthy anthropocene philosophy, She is no more unified an agency than is the human race that is supposed to occupy the other side of the bridge. (10)

According to Latour, this means that Gaia does not have to be a concept that haunts the borders of respectable science. Instead, Gaia, framed as above, should be perceived as a concept that can provide humans in the Anthropocene with a template through which their intertwinement with what the moderns understood as "Nature" (as in Latour, here written with a capital N) can be more properly grasped. That is, as the signifier of a dynamic relationship that in the era of the Anthropocene risks coming to human attention shaped as everything from minor disasters to abrupt and irreversible feedback loops. However, while Gaia interpreted, this way can be seen as the instigator of both the extremely destructive quasi-objects that appear in *The Day After Tomorrow* as well as the irreversible feedback loop of the ice age that faces the surviving characters in the end of the movie, the movie does not completely avoid falling into the "metaphysical trap" of alluding to a unified nonhuman world. For example, in the most revealing scene of how the narrative template of the Judgment underlines the plot of the movie, a "vulgar Gaia" reemerges from the depth of cultural history to replace the angered and punitive God of previous myths of human depravation. In one of the last scenes of the movie, the American Vice President, who has since become president, addresses the world's population in a televised speech:

> These past few weeks have left us all with a profound sense of humility in the face of nature's destructive power. For years, we operated under the belief that we could continue consuming our planet's natural resources without consequence. We were wrong. I was wrong.

In this scene, the movie operationalizes a conception of the nonhuman world that is not very Latourian, but much more in sync with a concept presented by Latour's mentor, Michel Serres, in one of the first philosophical books to tackle anthropogenic climate change. In Serres' *The Natural Contract* (1990) humanity is described as being in the midst of a war with the nonhuman world, or with "Nature" as Serres' calls it, as "the growth of our rational means carries us [humanity] off, at a speed difficult to estimate, in the direction of the destruction of the world" (14). The result of this is deemed to be that "the Earth is now a victim," but also that "its weakness forces strength to exhaust itself and thus our own strength to become gentler" (11–12). In other words, the human war on the nonhuman is integrated into a dialectical process of feedback loops that in the end will either "condemn us all . . . to automatic extinction" or humble humanity in such a way that it will become conscious of the fact that the weakness of the Earth is its own weakness, and change its Cartesian ontology of war and dominion into an ontology of symbiosis (14, 38).

I mention this because it is the latter route that humanity takes in the end of *The Day After Tomorrow*. The uncanniness of a world wherein quasi-objects accelerate in scale and destructiveness here becomes the instigator of a redefined human–nonhuman relationship. In fact, rather bizarrely, the movie ends by depicting the ice age triggered by anthropogenic global warming and the halting of the North Atlantic Current as what can best be described as a needed cleaning in the human oikos or household. Thus in the final scene of the movie, an astronaut looking at Earth from space asks a fellow astronaut if he has "ever seen the air so clear." In other words, the unhomely uncanny world that was activated as a judgment executed by the nonhuman world is here once again delivered over to a homely state. The astronaut's question fulfills the reenactment of the narrative template of the ancient Judgment myths, as the destruction caused by the nonhuman world becomes a moral cleansing or catharsis that is, in the final shot of the movie, not only literally depicted as an Earth cleaned of bad air. This scene also comes to function as a symbol of a humanity who has, through its initial punishment and later recognition of its mistakes, paid its moral debt in a maneuver that can best be philosophically described as a replacement of an ontology of dominion (Descartes) with an ontology of symbiosis (Serres).

This use of the Judgment as a narrative form is not solely restricted to *The Day After Tomorrow*, or indeed other cli-fis. As I have indicated above, the ancient imaginary of the Judgment is, in this slightly adjusted form wherein the nonhuman world or "Nature" becomes a "stand in" for the ancient God of moral punishment and purification, present in a number of other products of Western popular culture. In fact, it appears so frequently that I suggest we think of it as a part of a dominant repertoire of narrative

templates used in the Western imagination of anthropogenic climate change. That said, by pointing to the fact that narrative templates of ancient Judgment myths are one of the cognitive platforms of pre-understanding that the imagination of future anthropogenic climate change springs from, I am not out to make a critical or even climate skeptical claim.

What French philosopher Pascal Bruckner, who has recently labeled the fight against anthropogenic climate change as a "new secular religion," and other climate-change skeptics fail to understand is that even though anthropogenic climate change is, in some sense a culturally constructed phenomenon—and as such ontologically built on elements of bricolage—this does not prevent it from being something real (Bruckner 3). In fact, quite the opposite, as implied by Latour when he describes how quasi-objects such as anthropogenic climate change "are [always] simultaneously real, discursive and social" ("Modern" 50, 64). In making this point, Latour describes anthropogenic climate change as a scientific object that can simultaneously be perceived as both real and as culturally (or discursively) constructed and therefore also as "narrated and historical" ("Modern" 89).

Going a step further, Latour's argument could even be read as well-placed invitation to researchers of cultural studies and other humanistic disciplines to deal with the narrative and historical dimensions of climate change. Why? Because the epistemological consequences of framing climate change as a quasi-object mean that it can no longer be perceived as an object solely to be studied by the natural scientist. By framing anthropogenic climate change as a very large quasi-object, we can open up the study to the range of cultural constructions that this object engenders. In fact, it seems clear that the cultural construction and interpretation of this object is already underway in popular fiction and other kinds of artistic expression. This suggests that cli-fi has something to tell us not only about who we are and how we live now, but also who we may be in a climate-changed future.

NOTES

1. Just as the route of anthropogenic climate change from marginal theory to mainstream science represents a paradigmatic break in human history, so does the rise of fictions that depict and thematize this phenomenon mark a break or event in the history of fiction. The definition of cli-fi as a terminology should reflect this historical circumstance. I therefore proposed that the term should only be used to describe fictions of various genres that employ the specific scientific paradigm of anthropogenic climate change in their plot. That is to describe fictions that explicitly use humanity's emissions of greenhouse gasses as some kind of driver in their world-making.

2. Although the concept of Nature is deeply problematic as an ontological category in the light of the Anthropocene, I will frequently use the term in the last section, as it is often used in the fiction and philosophy here cited.

WORKS CITED

Bernstein, Larry, R. K. Pachauri, and Andy Reisinger. *"Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report."* Geneva: Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2008. Web. 31 Oct. 2014.

Bruckner, Pascal. *The Fanaticism of the Apocalypse: Save the Earth, Punish Human Beings*. Trans. Steven Rendall. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2013. Print.

Curtis, Claire P. *Postapocalyptic Fiction and the Social Contract*. Plymouth: Lexington Books, 2010. Print.

Freud, Sigmund. "The Uncanny." Trans. David McLintock. *The Uncanny.* London: Penguin Group, 2003. 121–62. Print.

Heidegger, Martin. *Being and Time*. Trans. John Macquarrieand Edward Robinson. Oxford: Blackwell, 2001. Print.

Latour, Bruno. *We Have Never Been Modern*. Trans. Catherine Porter. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993. Print.

———. *Politics of Nature*. Trans. Catherine Porter. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004. Print.

———. "Waiting for Gaia. Composing The Common World through Arts and Politics." 2011. Web. 31 Oct. 2014.

Lévi-Strauss, Claude. *La pensée sauvage*. Paris: Librarie Plon, 1962. Print.

Lovelock, James. *The Revenge of Gaia: Why the Earth is Fighting Back – and How We Can Still Save Humanity.* London: Penguin Group, 2006. Print.

Ricoeur, Paul. *Time and Narrative*. Vol. 1. Trans. Kathleen McLaughlin & David Pellauer. Chicago/London: The University of Chicago Press, 1984. Print.

———. *From Text to Action: Articles in Hermeneutics II*. Trans. John B. Thompson. London: Continuum, 2008. Print.

Schmitz, Hermann. *Der Gefühlraum*. Bonn: Bouvier, 2005. Print.

Serres, Michel. *The Natural Contract*. Trans. Elizabeth MacArthur and William Paulson. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1995. Print.

Simpson, Helen. "Diary of an Interesting Year." *In-Flight Entertainment*. London: Vintage, 2011. Print.